{
inputs,
outputs,
lib,
config,
pkgs,
...
}: {
environment.systemPackages = with pkgs; [
/* ------------------------- Essential Applications ------------------------- */
git
wine
bottles
onlyoffice-bin
google-chrome
microsoft-edge
/* ---------------------------- System Utilities ---------------------------- */
gnupg ffmpeg unzip
mpv gparted
libappindicator-gtk3
pavucontrol
hyfetch
];
programs.firefox.enable = true;
/* ----------------------------- Security Tweaks ---------------------------- */
# sets hidepid=2 on /proc (make process info visible only to owning user)
# NOTE Was removed on nixpkgs-unstable because it doesn't do anything
# security.hideProcessInformation = true;
# tmpfs = /tmp is mounted in ram. Doing so makes temp file management speedy
# on ssd systems and more secure (and volatile)! Because it's wiped on reboot.
boot.tmp.useTmpfs = lib.mkDefault true;
# If not using tmpfs, which is naturally purged on reboot, we must clean it
# /tmp ourselves. /tmp should be volatile storage!
boot.tmp.cleanOnBoot = lib.mkDefault (!config.boot.tmp.useTmpfs);
# Fix a security hole in place for backwards compatibility. See desc in
# nixpkgs/nixos/modules/system/boot/loader/systemd-boot/systemd-boot.nix
boot.loader.systemd-boot.editor = lib.mkDefault false;
boot.kernel.sysctl = {
# The Magic SysRq key is a key combo that allows users connected to the
# system console of a Linux kernel to perform some low-level commands.
# Disable it, since we don't need it, and is a potential security concern.
"kernel.sysrq" = 0;
## TCP hardening
# Prevent bogus ICMP errors from filling up logs.
"net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses" = 1;
# Reverse path filtering causes the kernel to do source validation of
# packets received from all interfaces. This can mitigate IP spoofing.
"net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter" = 1;
"net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter" = 1;
# Do not accept IP source route packets (we're not a router)
"net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route" = 0;
"net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route" = 0;
# Don't send ICMP redirects (again, we're not a router)
"net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects" = 0;
"net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects" = 0;
# Refuse ICMP redirects (MITM mitigations)
"net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects" = 0;
"net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects" = 0;
"net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects" = 0;
"net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects" = 0;
"net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects" = 0;
"net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects" = 0;
# Protects against SYN flood attacks
"net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies" = 1;
# Incomplete protection again TIME-WAIT assassination
"net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337" = 1;
## TCP optimization
# TCP Fast Open is a TCP extension that reduces network latency by packing
# data in the sender’s initial TCP SYN. Setting 3 = enable TCP Fast Open for
# both incoming and outgoing connections:
"net.ipv4.tcp_fastopen" = 3;
# Bufferbloat mitigations + slight improvement in throughput & latency
"net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control" = "bbr";
"net.core.default_qdisc" = "cake";
};
boot.kernelModules = [ "tcp_bbr" ];
# Harden SSH client
programs.ssh = {
# Known vulnerability. See
# https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/110639/how-exploitable-is-the-recent-useroaming-ssh-vulnerability
extraConfig = ''
Host *
UseRoaming no
'';
}