{
  inputs,
  outputs,
  lib,
  config,
  pkgs,
  ...
}: {
    environment.systemPackages = with pkgs; [
        /* ------------------------- Essential Applications ------------------------- */
        git
        wine
        bottles
        onlyoffice-bin
        google-chrome
        microsoft-edge

        /* ---------------------------- System Utilities ---------------------------- */
        gnupg ffmpeg unzip
        mpv gparted
        libappindicator-gtk3
        pavucontrol
        hyfetch
    ];

    programs.firefox.enable = true;

    /* ----------------------------- Security Tweaks ---------------------------- */

    # sets hidepid=2 on /proc (make process info visible only to owning user)
    # NOTE Was removed on nixpkgs-unstable because it doesn't do anything
    # security.hideProcessInformation = true;

    # tmpfs = /tmp is mounted in ram. Doing so makes temp file management speedy
    # on ssd systems and more secure (and volatile)! Because it's wiped on reboot.
    boot.tmp.useTmpfs = lib.mkDefault true;
    # If not using tmpfs, which is naturally purged on reboot, we must clean it
    # /tmp ourselves. /tmp should be volatile storage!
    boot.tmp.cleanOnBoot = lib.mkDefault (!config.boot.tmp.useTmpfs);

    # Fix a security hole in place for backwards compatibility. See desc in
    # nixpkgs/nixos/modules/system/boot/loader/systemd-boot/systemd-boot.nix
    boot.loader.systemd-boot.editor = lib.mkDefault false;

    boot.kernel.sysctl = {
        # The Magic SysRq key is a key combo that allows users connected to the
        # system console of a Linux kernel to perform some low-level commands.
        # Disable it, since we don't need it, and is a potential security concern.
        "kernel.sysrq" = 0;

        ## TCP hardening
        # Prevent bogus ICMP errors from filling up logs.
        "net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses" = 1;
        # Reverse path filtering causes the kernel to do source validation of
        # packets received from all interfaces. This can mitigate IP spoofing.
        "net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter" = 1;
        "net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter" = 1;
        # Do not accept IP source route packets (we're not a router)
        "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route" = 0;
        "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route" = 0;
        # Don't send ICMP redirects (again, we're not a router)
        "net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects" = 0;
        "net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects" = 0;
        # Refuse ICMP redirects (MITM mitigations)
        "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects" = 0;
        "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects" = 0;
        "net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects" = 0;
        "net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects" = 0;
        "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects" = 0;
        "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects" = 0;
        # Protects against SYN flood attacks
        "net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies" = 1;
        # Incomplete protection again TIME-WAIT assassination
        "net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337" = 1;

        ## TCP optimization
        # TCP Fast Open is a TCP extension that reduces network latency by packing
        # data in the sender’s initial TCP SYN. Setting 3 = enable TCP Fast Open for
        # both incoming and outgoing connections:
        "net.ipv4.tcp_fastopen" = 3;
        # Bufferbloat mitigations + slight improvement in throughput & latency
        "net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control" = "bbr";
        "net.core.default_qdisc" = "cake";
    };
    boot.kernelModules = [ "tcp_bbr" ];

    # Harden SSH client
    programs.ssh = {
    # Known vulnerability. See
    # https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/110639/how-exploitable-is-the-recent-useroaming-ssh-vulnerability
    extraConfig = ''
        Host *
        UseRoaming no
    '';
    };
}